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1. SUMMARY: This case raises the issue of the legality of the President's -
imposition of oil import tariffs under the Trade Expansion Act of 1962. The distric t 
court sustained presidential authority against a challenge that his power to curb oil 
imports was statutorily limited to such direct import controls as quotas. A divided C 
DC disagreed , and held that indirect controls such as tariffs were beyond the bound s 
of proper control mechanisms, 
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2. FACTS: Off!al conce r n with the infiux of .ported oil is of relatively 
recent origin. Acting under the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1955, President 
Eisenhower in 1959 established a Mandatory Oil Import Program. This program 
mandated several procedures: (1) petroleum importers were required to secure a 
license; (2) the country was divided into five importing districts; and (3) import quot23 
were established for each district. Al-tlfough frequently amended, this program re-
mained in ef feet from 1959 to May l, 1973. 
By presidential proclamation, President Nixon in 1973 signaled a major change 
in the import control mechanism. Under the new plan, the quota system was abolishec. 
In its place, a schedule of lie ens e fees, to be paid by oil importers, was instituted. 
Under presidential timetableq fees would increase over a two-year period from 10. 5 
cents a barrel to 21 cents /bbl. 
President Nixon's action was taken pursuant to § 232(b) of the Trade Expansion 
Act of 1962, 19 U.S. C. § 1862(b), the succe'ssor legislation to the 1955 measure unde::-
which President Eisenhower had acted. Section 232 (b) sets forth various procedure3 
to be followed when imports of a particular article may affect national security. The 
operative language provides: 
"If the Secretary [of the Treasury] finds that such 
article is being imported into the United States in such quantities 
or under such circumstances as to threaten to impair the national 
security, he shall so advise the President and the President shall 
take such action, and for such time, as he deems necessary to 
adjust the imports of such article and its derivatives so that such 
imports will not threaten to impair the national security .... " 
[Emphasis supplied. ] 
Early this year, Secretary of the Treasury Simon announced an investigation : :-.~ 
the current level of oil imports in light of pas sible national security repercussions. 
A flurry of executive agency activity followed, with the result that, only 10 days la t e::- . 
-.,. 
(-
• 
- - 3 
Secre!a r y Simon reported that petroleum products wer ~ deed being imported at 7 
dangerously h igh leve l s. 
Nine d a y s after the Secretary's recommendation, President Ford issued 
P roclamation N o . 4341 , the document that gave rise to the present controversy. B y 
t h e Proclam a t i on 's terms, the two-year fee schedules announced by President Nixon 
were accelera ted. In addition, the Proclamation imposed supplemental fees of $3 pe r 
barrel on imp o rted crude and $1. 30/bbl on petroleum products. The supplemental 
f.:;:., on crud e oil was to be imposed in three monthly ste~ each from February 
to April 1975 , whil e the lower fee on petroleum products was to be added in March 
and April. 
T h e sys t em of supplemental fees proved to be the straw that broke the camel 1 s 
b a ck . F our d a y s a f ter the President'sannouncement, a veritable horde of plaintiffs -
rushed into federal district court. The plaintiffs included eight states and _their 
g ove rnors , t en utility companies (including resp Algonquin SNG), and Father Drinan ? 
(D. Ma-~s. ). T he complainants argued that the Nixon-Ford scheme of fees exceeded 
presid en tia l authority granted by Section 232(b) of the Trade Expansion Act. Specifi -
c ally, r esps contended that the authority given to the President to "take such action .. . 
a s he d eems n ecessary to adjust the imports" [emphasis supplied ] encompassed on ::.· 
s uch d irect mechanisms as import quotas, the traditional method employed since 1 °:-:, 
R esp s also urged that various procedural steps mandated by the Act were not f oll o\":e-:. 
p r i or to imposition of the fees and that no environmental impact statement had bee:: 
fil ed . 
T he d i stri ct court (D. D. C. ) (Pratt sustained the President's action. The 
c our t c oncluded: 
,,.  
. Jll1 
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" It is ! judgment that the license fee . ogram is 
one of a number of possible actions covered in the non-defined 
phrase 'to ad just imp o,.rts' conta ined in Section 232 (b) and that 
the program in cluding the fee i s a regulatory measure enacted 
f o r the protection of national s ecurity. Certainly, if the term 
includes quotas and ~ven a comp lete embarg o, as plaintiffs 
admit, it can responsibly be interpreted to include imports 
subject to fees, however steep." Petn., at 42a. 
The court also determined that no procedural irregularity infected the President's 
a c tion. 
A divided CA DC reversed, c oncluding that fees on imports were unauthorized 
-b y the statute. T h e court b a s ed its determination on three factors: 
A. Tradit i onal ' ~ongr e s si onal contro( ~ ver foreign trade. 
An examination of various t rade provisions indicated that congressional delegati o r 
ha d been n a rrow and explicit in order to effectuate well-defined goals. As against 
this system, the President's interp r etation of § 232 (b) "would represent an anomalous 
(f del e gation of almost unbridled disc retion and authority in the tariff area." · Petn. , at 
~ 
14a . 
B. Legi s lative Histo ry of § 232(b). 
Cong ress opted f o r a gene r alized approach to import control, rather than provid . 
ing for prote c t ion of particular c ommodities and establishing quotas for each. The 
intended s cope of the a uthori ty , however, was to limit presidential action to direct 
controls . This intent was manifest in the floor debates, including a colloquy between 
Senators Saltonstall and Byrd in which the latter stated: "[The provision] simply lea vE 
to the President the power , i n his discretion, to decide whether to impose a quota or 
reduce the imports . " ' Petn. , at 16a [Emphasis in original]. Contrary statements 
by sena t ors interested in protecting indigenous industries in their home states were n 
dispositive . Thus , no significance could be attached to a statement by Senator Millib 
of Colorado to the effect that the President could take whatever action he deems 
,e 
-
~ 
necessary, including 
- 5 . 
the use of "tariffs, quotas, impor .. xes, or other methods of 
import restriction." 
Finally, Congress' limited intent was suggested by its rejection in 1962 of a 
proposed § 353 to the Trade Expansion Act. Under the proposed provision, the 
President would have been given authority to impose duties on imports he found neces -
sary in the "national interest." This proposal explicitly gave the President the same 
authority he claims implicitly from § 232 (b). The only conclusion to be drawn from 
the provision's rejection was that Congress did not confer by§ 232(b) the authority 
the President now claims. 
c . Recent case law as limiting the scope of permissible "fees." 
In the majority's view, Congress could have permitted the President to impose 
license fees to off-set the administrative costs of the old quota program. In fact, 
however, the President conceived his authority as justifying a fee levied f~r "non-
revenue purposes." This expansive interpretation of "fees" has been rejected by 
. / 
this Court in recent decisions, including National Cable Television Association, Inc. v 
United States, 415 U.S. 336. That case struck down the FCC's attempt to impose 
fees which were unrelated to the benefits conferred and were not necessary to cover 
the costs of administering the particular regulatory program involved. 
Given these three bases, the court held the presidential fee program invalid. ------It therefore did not reach the res ps' procedural arguments. 
Judge Robb dissented. He found no statutory distinction between such contr 9 l 
--- .....I 
mechanisms as "quotas" or "embargoes" on the one hand and "license fees" on the -
other. Rather, the statute, in J .udge Robb's view, broadly authorizes the President --to take such action as he deems necessary, "without purporting to limit in any wa y 
the kind of action available to the President." Petn., at 30a. 
, . 
-
ce 
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"": f The c urr ent statu~f oil tariffs is not entirely cl-. Resps point out that the 
$-. 6 0/b bl. fe e on imported refined petroleum products was removed as of September 22, 
l.975. A s to the supplementary fee on crude oil, the principal bone of contention, the 
J~es p s s tate that a presidential decision should be forthcoming shortly as to whether 
thos e fee s will be eliminated. 
3, C ONTENTIONS: SG says (1) the question is of urgent importance, since 
the Pr e s id ent has found the use of quotas to be unsuitable in controlling imports while 
a.voidin g temporary shortages; (2) the majority's decision rests upon an incorrect 
~.naly s i s of c ongressional intent since the floor debates clearly indicated a congress-
i onal under s tanding that the President could impose fees as an import control device ; 
a nd {3 ) a b road interpretation of § 232 would not signal a departure from the tradi-
tional legi s lative pattern in this area, since § 351 (a)(l) of the same Act confers 
ana logous authority on the President when imports threaten to injure a competitive 
domesti c i ndustry. Finally, Congress' rejection of proposed § 353 related to a broad 
provi s lon addressed to the "national interest," not one more narrowly concerned wi t:-i 
~'nationa l security" and accompanied by procedural safeguards. 
Massachusetts responds that (1) the Administration has announced its intention 
to aband on the license fee program, so there is no compelling reason to take the cas e: 
( 2) rules of strict statutory construction apply in order to save this statute from in-
of 
validity on grounds of excessive congressional delegation/power; the CA majority 
properly considered all relevant factors, including the failure in 1962 to enact pro-
pos ed § 3 53 , in determining Congress' intent; and (3) petrs can claim no relief in 
a ny event by virtue of procedural violations not addressed by CA DC. 
Algonquin adds that (1) the CA 's decision is not terribly important since it only 
~ r ules out one of many ways in which the President can seek to curb imports ; (2) th e 
J~ 
~-.,, 
(-
l 
-
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Court will be embroili!itself in what has turned into .aging controversy between 
the Administration and Congress over appropriate energy policies; (3) the SG is 
b elatedly offering new pieces of legislative history which he failed to mention before 
the CA ; and (4) the CA 's decision is correct under this Court's recent decisions limiting 
the ambit of permissible "fees" imposed by the executive branch. 
I 
4 . DISCUSSION: The ever-changing status of import fees in the Administration ' s 
energy p olicies does not appear to cut against the importance of this case. The 
P res i dent continues to claim authority to impose such controls, and there is no indica-
ti. on that the entire system has been dismantled. In fact, much of the political 
1naneuve ring between the White House and Capitol Hill referred to by resps has 
occurred after the CA's decision in this case. There seems little danger of rendering 
an advis ory opinion on the matter, and ~ one is arguing mootnes s on grounds of a 
presidential intent to abandon import fees. Nonetheless, it would perhap~ be appro-
priate t o request the SG to advise the Court of factual developments since the filing of 
his petition to clear up some of the uncertainties lingering in this case, 
T he appropriateness in taking the case is also suggested by the very high likeli-
hood that the CA majority is dead wrong. The only clear-cut statement during the 
congres sional debates as to the appropriate means of adjusting imports (that by Sena to: --Milliken of Colorado) wholeheartedly supports the SG's interpretation, At the very 
l east, no clear indication exists that the admittedly broad language of the statute was 
intend ed to permit the President to shut off imports entirely, while precluding a polic ~ 
designed to render imported oil less competitive but at the same time allowing unli rr.i : 
supplies of the high-priced foreign crude into American markets. 
There are responses from the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and Algonquin, S 
10/20/75 Starr Ops in petn. 
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4/16/76 - -
VERY BOBTAIL BENCH MEMORANDUM 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Chris Whitman 
DATE: April 16, 1976 
No. 75-382 Federal Energy Administration 
v. Algonquin SNG, Inc. 
This is a difficult and close case. The legislative 
history is sufficiently ambiguous that, I think, a convincing 
opinion could be written either way. My inclination, however, 
i s to affirm - on the basis of an opinion very different 
from that written by CADC. 
The CADC opinion on its face is completely unconvincing. 
There are obvious responses to every point it makes and 
obvious contrary interpretations of every statement in the 
legislative history upon which it relies. These have all been 
pointed out neatly by the SG and by a student author who has 
penned a note urging reversal in 89 Harv. L. Rev. 436 432 
(Dec. 1975). But neither the SG nor the note-writer makes 
a good affirmative case for an interpretation of the statute 
that would give the President the power to impose fees. 
Instead, they both merely point out the holes in the arguments 
that CADC used to interpret the statute to mean that the 
President has no such power. The respondent's brief does a 
much better job than the CADC opinion in making the case 
against the President's power, and, unlike the SG and the 
Harvard note, it does build an affirmative case. That is why 
I'm inclined to affirm. 
-
-
-
- - 2. 
It is clear that the statute does not expressly draw the 
distinction between direct and indirect methods of affecting -imports that CADC perceived. Respondent points out, however, 
that the phrase "to adjust the imports" can be fairly read -
and has been read - to refer only to quotas, for quotas are 
the only means by which imports can be adjusted in a direct 
and predictable way. 
The factor that influences me to urge affirmance is the -
sense I get from looking back over the tempetuous debates 
about foreign trade relations and the division of power between 
the President and Congress, that Congress never intended to 
grant to the President wide-ranging authority of the sort the 
SG claims was granted in§ 1862(b). Under the SG's interpre-
tation, the President can do anything that has my impact on 
imports, however remote, so long as he abides by the procedural 
requirements and finds a "national security" need. 
7 
The CADC opinion merely asserts that such an interpretation 
is contrary to everthing Congress has done in the past - for 
all other grants of authority to the President have been very 
narrowly defined. The respondent's brief - which I will not \ 
repeat here - provides the detail that makes that more convincing 
than a mere assertion. 
Congress has been reluctant to grant - and the courts 
have been reluctant to infer a grant of - the power to tax, 
with the extraordinary discretion and arbitrariness that that 
power implies when exercised without any substantive standards. 
..... . . .. 
-
-
• 
- - 3. 
And Congress in all the various Trade Acts has narrowly 
limited every delegation of power - except, the SG argues, 
this one. This is a hotly contested area, with a great and 
continuing debate over the proper approach to take - protection 
versus free trade. Yet there was no discussion at the time 
that§ 1862(b) was enacted over whether the President should 
be given the power to impose duties or fees. Under the circum-
stances, I think it highly unlikely that Congress intended to 
do what the SG says it did. It could, however, have spoken 
much more clearly. 
Chris 
ss 
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No. 75-382 - Federal Energy Administration, et al. v. Algonquin 
MR. 
SNG, et al. 
JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court. T_ ~ 
Section 2 32 (b) of the Trade Expansion Act of I 96 2, Pub. L.t./ / l) 
No. 87-794, 76 Stat. 877, as amended by§ J27(d) of the Trade Ac~ 
of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1993, 19 U.S. C. 1862 (b) 
(Supp. IV), provides that if the Secretary of the Treasury finds that 
an "article is being imported into the United States in such quantities 
or under such circumstances as to threaten to impair the national 
security, " the President is authorized to 
"take such action, and for such time, as he deems 
necessary to adjust the imports of [the] article and 
its derivatives so that ... imports [of the article] 
will not threaten to impair the national security. 11 l / 
All parties to this case agree that § 232(b) authorizes the President 
to adjust the imports of petroleum and petroleum products by imposing -----
quotas on such imports. What we must decide is whether § 2 32 (b) a lso 
- -- 2 -
authorizes the President to control such imports by imposing on them 
a system of monetary exactions in the form of license fees. 
I 
The predecessor statute to § 232(b) was originally enacted by 
Congress as part of the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1955, 
Pub. L. No. 84-86, § 7, 69 Stat. 162, 166, seen. 13 infra, and 
amended by the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1958. Pub. L. 
No. 85-686, § 8, 72 Stat. 673. The advisory function currently per-
formed under § 232(b) by the Secretary of the Treasury was performed 
by the Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM) under the 
1955 and 1958 statutes. But, like§ 232(b), those statutes allowed the 
President, on a finding that imports of an article were threatening "to 
impair the national security, 11 to "take such action as he deem[ed] 
necessary to adjust the imports of [the] article ..•. 11 In 1959, 
President Eisenhower, having been advised by the Director of ODM 
that "crude oil and the principal crude oil derivatives and products 
are being imported in such quantities and under such circumstances 
as to threaten to impair the national security, 11 invoked the 1958 version 
of the provision and established the Mandatory Oil Import Program 
(MOIP). Pres. Proc. 3279, 24 Fed. Reg. 2781. The MOIP, designed 
to reduce the gap between domestic supply and demand by encouraging 
the development of domestic production and refinery capacity, imposed 
- - 3 -
a system of quotas on the importation of petroleum and petroleum 
products. The program was not wholly successful, however and in the 
face of domestic consumption which continued to grow faster than domestic 
production, Presidents Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon each felt compelled 
to amend it by raising the pcrmis sible quota levels. 
In light of a Cabinet task force conclusion that the MOIP, as then 
2 / 
constituted, was not fulfilling its objectives, President Nixon, acting 
pursuant to § 232(b), radically amended the program in 1973. Pr es. 
Proc. 4210, 38 Fed. Reg. 9645. The President suspended existing 
tariffs on oil imports and provided "for a gradual transition from the 
existing quota method of adjusting imports of petr0leum and petroleum 
products to a long-term program for adjustment of imports of petroleum 
and petroleum products through .•• the institution of a system of fees 
...-- applicable to imports of crude oil, unfinished oils and finished products". 
Id, at 9646. This amended program established a gradually increasing 
schedule of license fees for importers. With respect to crude oil, the 
fee was scheduled to increase from an initial 10 1/2 cents per barrel on 
May l, 1973 to 21 cents per barrel on November 1, 1975. With respe ct 
to most finished petroleum products, the fee would rise gradually from 
15 cents per barrel on May 1, 1973 to 63 cents per barrel on November 1, 
3 I 
1975. Id., at 9649. While initially some oil imports were exempted 
- - 4 -
from the license fee requirements, the exemption levels were scheduled 
to decrease gradually so that by 1980 the fees were to be applicable to 
all oil imports. 
President Nixon's 1973 program apparently did not wholly fulfill 
the objectives to which it was directed. Accordingly, the Secretary of 
the Treasury, acting pursuant to § 232(b), seen. 1 supra, initiated an 
investigation on January 4, 1975, "to determine the effects on the national 
security of imports of petroleum and petroleum products." Memorandum 
from Secretary of the Treasury Simon to Assistant Secretary of the 
Treasury MacDonald (Memorandum), App., at 154. While § 232(b) 
directs the Secretary "if it is appropriate [to do so, to J ..• hold public 
hearings or otherwise afford interested parties an opportunity to present 
information and advice" as part of such an investigation, 19 U.S. C. § 1862(b), 
the Secretary found that such procedures would interfere with "national 
security interests" and were "inappropriate" in this case. Memorandum, 
App., at 154. The investigation therefore proceeded without any public 
C: 
hearing or call for submissiori from interested nongovernmental parties. 
The Secretary submitted a report on his investigation to President 
Ford on January 14, 1975. Intimating that the measures then in force 
under § 232(b) had indeed not solved the problems to which they were 
directed, the Secretary indicated that the United States' dependence on 
foreign oil had continued to increase since 1966 and that foreign sources 
- - 5 - -
currently accounted for well over a third of domestic consumption, The 
Secretary concluded that: 
that: 
"crude oil, principal crude oil derivatives and 
products, and related products derived from 
natural gas and coal tar are being imported into 
the United States in such quantities as to threaten 
to impair the national security [and] the foregoing 
products are being imported into the United States 
under such circumstances as to threaten to impair 
the national security. 11 App., at 133, 
Relying on his findings, the Secretary recommended to the President 
"appropriate action be taken to reduce imports of 
crude oil, principal crude oil derivatives and 
products, and related products derived from 
natural gas and coal tar into the United States. 11 
Ibid, 
The President agreed with the results of the Secretary's investigation 
and concluded that it was "necessary and consistent with the national 
security to further discourage importation into the United States of petro-
leum, petroleum products, and related products, 11 Pres. Proc. 4341, 
40 Fed. Reg, 3965. Accordingly, invoking § 232(b) he issued a procla-
mation on January 23, 1975 which, effective immediately, raised the so-
called "first-tier" license fees that were imposed in 1973 to the maximum 
4 I 
levels previously scheduled to be reached only some months later. Ibid. 
The proclamation also imposed on all imported oil, whether covered by 
the first-tier fees or not, a supplemental fee of $1. 00 per barrel for oil 
- - 6 -
entering the United States on or after February 1, 1975. The suppl emental 
fee was scheduled to rise to $2. 00 a barrel for oil entering after March l, 
5 I 
1975, and to reach $3. 00 per barrel for oil entering after Aprill, 1975. 
Finally, the proclamation reinstated the tariffs that had been suspended 
in April 1973. The Federal Energy Administration (F'EA) soon after 
issuance of the proclamation amended its oil import regulations in order 
to imple1nent it. 40 Fed. Reg. 4771-4776 (1975). 
Four days after the proclamation was issued, respondents - eight 
6 / 7 / 
states and their governors, ten utility companies, and Congressman 
Robert P. Drinan of Massachusetts - challenged the license fees by filing 
two suits agains t the Secretary of the Treasury, the Administrator of FEA 
and the Treasurer of the United States in the United States District Court 
for the District of Columbia. Seeking declaratory and injunctive r elief, 
they alleged that the imposition of the fees was beyond the President's 
statutory authority under § 232(b), that the fees were imposed without 
necessary procedural steps having been taken, and that petitioners 
(hereinafter the Government) violated the National Environmental Policy 
Act (NEPA), 42 U.S. C. § § 4321 ~~-, by failing to prepare an environ-
mental impact statement prior to the imposition of the fees. 
The District Court d enied respondents I motions for preliminary 
injunctions and filed findings of fact and conclusions of law which, at the 
- -- 7 -
request of respondents, it later declared would constitute its final 
judgments in the cases. See 518 F. 2d 1064 (1975) (appendix to dissenting 
opinion in Court of Appeals). The court found that § 232(b) is a valid 
delegation to the President of the power to impose license fees on oil 
imports. 518 F. 2d at 1064-1066. It further ruled that the procedures 
followed by the President and the Secretary of the Treasury in imposing 
the license fees fully conformed to the requirements of the statute. Id., 
at 1068. Finally, the court held that "in view of the emergency nature of 
the problem and the need for prompt action", id., at 1069, the Government 
was not required to file an environmental impact statement prior to 
imposition of the fees and hence was not in violation of NEPA. Id., at 
1069. 
Respondents' appeals from these judgments were consolidated with 
their petitions to the Court of Appeals for the D. C. Circuit for review of 
the FEA regulations implementing the license fee program. The allegations 
in the challenges to the regulations were substantially the same as those 
raised in the District Court actions, adding only a contention that the 
FEA had failed to follow certain procedural provisions of the Federal Ener gy 
Administration Act, 15 U.S. C. § § 761 ~~- The Court of Appeals with 
one judge dissenting, held that § 232(b) does not authorize the President 
to impose a license fee scheme as a method of adjusting imports. 518 F. 2d 
1051 (1975). According to the court, reading the stah.1te to authorize the 
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action taken by the President "would be an anomalous departure 1 ' from 
11 the consistently explicit, well-defined manner in which Congress has 
delegated control over foreign trade and tariffs. 11 Id., at 1055. In the 
court 1 s view, § 232(b) 1 s legislative history indicated that Congress 1 
authorization of the President to "adjust the imports of [an] articl e " 
encompassed only the use of 11 direct 11 controls such as quotas and did not 
encompass the use of license fees. Id., at 1059. Finding no need to address 
any of the other issues that were raised, the court reversed the judgment 
of the District Court, instructed that court to enter appropriate relief 
for respondents, and set aside the challenged Federal Energy Administration 
regulations. 
The Government sought this Court's review. We granted certiorari, 
8 I 
423 U.S. 923 (1975), and now reverse. Both the words of§ 232(b) and 
its legislative history lead us to conclude that it authorizes the action 
9 / -
tak:n by the President in t'lii s case. 
II 
A 
Preliminarily, we reject respondents 1 sugge stion that we must 
construe § 232(b) narrowly in order to avoid "a serious question of 
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. 11 Brief for R e spondents, 
at 4·2. Even if § 232(b) is read to authorize the imposition of a lic ense fe e 
- 9 -
system, the standards that it provides the President in its implementation 
are clearly sufficient to meet any delegation doctrine attack. 
In Hampton & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928), this 
Court upheld the constitutionality of a provision empowering the President 
to increase or decrease import duties in order to equalize the differences 
between foreign and domestic production costs for similar articles. In 
doing so, we stated: 
11 !£ Congr ess shall lay down by legislative act an 
intelligible principle to which the [President] is 
directed to conform, such legislative action is not a 
forbidden delegation of legislative power. 11 Id., at 
409. 
Section 232(b) easily fulfills that test. It establishes clear preconditions 
to Presidential action - inter alia, a finding by the Secretary of the 
Treasury that an "article is being imported into the United States in such 
quantiti es or under such circumstances as to threaten to impair the 
national security. 11 Moreover, the leeway that the statute gives the 
President i11 deciding what action to take in the event the preconditions are 
fulfilled is far from unbounded. The President can act only to the extent 
"he deems necessary to adjust the imports of such article and its deriv-
atives so that such imports will not threaten to impair the national 
/v- security. 11 And § 232(c), seen. l supra, articulates a series of specific 
✓ factors to b .e considered by th e President in . exercising his authority 
10 / 
under § 232(b). In light of these factors and our recognition that 
- 10 -
11 (n]ecessity ..• fixes a point beyond which it is unreasonable and 
impracticable to compel Congress to prescribe detailed rules .•. 11 
American Power & Light Co, v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 
11 / 
329 U.S. 90, 105 (1946), we see no looming problem of improper delegation 
that should affect our reading of§ 232(b). 
B 
In authorizing the President to "take such action and for such time, 
as he deems necessary to adjust the imports of (an] article and its deriv-
atives," the language of § 232(b) seems clearly to grant him a measure 
of discretion in determining the method to be used to adjust imports. We 
find no support in the language of the statute for respondents' content~on 
that the authorization to the President to "adjust" imports should be read 
to encompass only quantitative methods - i. e , quotas - as opposed to 
monetary methods - i. e,, license fees - of effecting such adjustments. 
Indeed, reading respondents' suggested limitation into the word 
"adjust" would be inconsistent with the range of factors that can trigger 
the President's authority under § 232 (b)' s language. Section 232(b) 
authorizes the President to act after a finding by the Secretary of the 
Treasury that a given article is being imported 11 in such quantities or und e r 
such circumstances as to threaten to impair the national security. 11 (Empha sis 
added. ) The emphasized language reflects Congress' judgment that "not 
only the quantity of imports ..• but also the circumstances under which 
/ 
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they are coming in: their use, th eir availability, their character' 1 could 
endanger the national security and hence should be a potential basis for 
Presidential action. 104 Cong. Rec. 10542-10543 (remarks of Rep. Mills), 
It is most unlikely that Congress would have provided that dangers posed 
by factors other than the strict quantitative level of imports can justify 
Presidential action but that that action must be confined to the imposition 
of quotas. Unless one assume s, and we do not, that quotas will always b e 
a feasible method of dealing directly with national security threats posed 
by the "circumstances under which imports are entering the country," 
limiting the President to the use of quotas and barring the use of license fe e s 
would effectively and artifically prohibit him from directly dealing with 
some of the very problems against which § 232(b) is directed, 
Turning from § 232 1 s language to its legislative history, again th e r e 
is much to suggest that the Pr esident 1 s authority extends to the imposition 
of monetary ex actions - i • e. license fees and duties. Looking at the 
original enactment of the provision in 1955 as well as Congress' periodic 
reconsideration of it in subsequent years, we find substantial grounds on 
which to conclude that its authorization extends beyond the imposition of 
quotas to the type of action chall enged here. 
During Congressional hearings on the Trade Agreements E x tension 
Act of .1955, there was substantial testimony that increased imports were 
threatening to damage various domestic industries whose viability was 
- 12 - -
12 / 
perceived to be critical to the national security. In an effort to deal 
with the problem, the Senate Committee on Finance considered several 
proposals designed to supplement the existing statutory provision, known 
13 / 
as the Symington Amendment which barred reductions in duties "on any 
article if the President finds that such reduction would threaten domestic 
production needed for projected national defense requirements. 11 Act of 
14 / 
July 1, 1954, Pub L. No. 83-464 68 Stat. 360. Among these amendme nts 
was one proposed by Senator Neely which provided in relevant part: 
"[T]he President shall take such action as is 
necessary to restrict imports of commodities 
whenever such imports threaten to retard the 
domestic development and expansion or main-
tenance of domestic production of natural resource 
commodities or any other commodities which he 
determines to be essential to the national security. 
11 Hearings on H. R. 1 before the Senate 
Committee on Finance, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 
1032-1033 (1955) (hereinafter cited as 1955 Senate 
Hearings), l$' (Emphasis added). 
In explaining what action would be authorized under the Neely amendment, 
Senator Martin, one of its co-sponsors, explained that it authorized the 
President "to take such action as is necessary, including the imposition 
of import quotas or the increase in duties, to protect the domestic industry 
concerned. 11 1955 Senate Hearings, 2097 (emphasis added). Thus, the 
Neely amendment cl e arly would have given the President the authority to 
impose monetary exactions as a method of restricting imports. 
- -- 13 -
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While Neely amendment was not reported out of committee, it is 
strikingly similar in language to the Byrd-Millikin amendment - the 
substitute provision that was reported out and eventually enacted into 
law. The Byrd-Millikin amendment authorized the President, after 
appropriate recommendations had been made by the Director of the Office 
of Defense Mobilization, to 11 take such action as he deems necessary to 
adjust the imports of [an] article to a level that will not threaten to impair 
the national security. 11 S. Rep. No. 232, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 14 
16 / 
(1955). (Emphasis added). Given the similarity in the operative language 
of the two proposals, it is fair to infer that if, as Senator Martin stated, 
the Neely amendment was intended to authorize the imposition of monetary 
exactions, so too was the Byrd-Millikin amendment. 
The debate on the Senate floor lends further support to this reading 
of the Byrd-Millikin amendment. Senator Millikin himself stated without 
contradiction that the amendment authorized the President 11 to take whatever 
action he deems necessary to adjust imports [including the use of] tariffs, 
quotas, import taxes or other methods of import restriction.'' 101 Cong. 
Rec. 5299 (1955). As a statement of one of the legislation's sponsors, 
this explanation of course deserves to be accorded substantial weight in 
interpreting the statute. National Woodworkers Manufacturers Assn. v. 
NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 640 (1967); Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers 
17 / 
Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 394-395 (1951). 
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Senator Millikin' s statement does not stand alone. Senator Byrd, 
another of the amendment's sponsors, explained in colloquy with Senator 
Saltonstall that the amendment put all commodities "on the same basis as 
✓ agricultural commodities. It simply leaves to the President the power, 
in his discretion, to decide whether to impose a quota or to reduc e the 
imports. 11 10 I Cong. Rec. 5297 ( 1955) (emphasis added). The reference 
in the emphasized phrase is to § 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, 
the subject of an earlier exchange between Senator Byrd and Senator Thye. 
10 I Cong. Rec. 5 29 6 ( 1955 ). Section 22 allows the President under certain 
circumstances to "impose such fees ••• or such quantitative limitations 
... as he finds ••. necessary" to protect the domestic production of 
an agricultural commodity. 7 U.S. C. § 624(b) (emphasis added). Senato r 
Byrd's comparison of § 22 and the Byrd-Millikin amendment thereafter 
appears to reflect his understanding that Presidential authority under the 
18/ 
amendment extended to the imposition of fees. 
Finally, we note two other statem.ents on the floor of the Senate 
which lend direct support to the Government's reading of the Byrd- Millikin 
amendment. Senator Bennett stated that it was his understanding that the 
amendment would authorize use of "the entire scope of tariffs, quotas, 
restrictions, stockpiling and any other variation of these programs in 
19/ 
order to protect a particular industry." 101 Cong. Rec. 5588 ( 1955 ). 
And Senator Barkley, a member of the Senate Committee on Finance, 
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expressed his understanding that the amendment would allow the 
President to "impose such quotas or take such other steps as he may 
believe to be desirable in order to maintain the national security. 11 
Id., at 5298 (e1nphasis added). 
Moving to the House debate following Senate passage of the 
Byrd-Millikin amendment, 101 Cong. Rec, 5 655 ( 1955), and its accept-
ance with a minor modification by the House conferees, H. R. Cong. 
Rep. No. 745, 84th Cong,, 1st Sess. 2, 6-7 (1955), we find further 
indications that it authorized the imposition of monetary exaction s . In 
explaining the provisions of the amendment, Congressman Cooper, 
chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee and a member of 
the conference committee, indicated his concern in connection with the 
. amendment that 11 any modification of a duty on imports or a quota w ould 
[because of retaliation from abroad] inevitably result in a curtailment 
of exports by the United States. 11 101 Cong. Rec. 8161 ( 1955) (emphasis 
added). Furthermore, as part of his ex planation of the amendment, 
Cooper presented a letter he had received from Gerald D. Morgan, 
Special Counsel to the President, which expressed the Administration's 
understanding that under the amendment, the President's action to adjust 
imports "could take any form that was appropriate to the situation. " 101 
20 / 
Cong. Rec. 8162 (1955). Thus, when Congress finally enacted the 
21/ 
Byrd-Millikin amendment's national security provision, 69 Stat. 166, 
/ 
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- -not only had M emb ers of both Houses indicated that the provision 
authorized the imposition of monetary exactions but the Executive Branch 
too had advised the Congress of its understanding of the broad scope of 
22/ 
the authority that the amendment contained. 
Three years later, in the context of its consideration of the 
Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1958, Congress reexamined t he Byrd -
Millikin national security provision. In the course of its deliberations, 
the Subcommittee on Foreign Trade Policy of the House Ways and Means 
Committee had before it a 1957 report submitted to it by the Office of 
Defense Mobilization expressing the views of the Executive Branch that 
the imposition of new or increased tariff duties on imports ... [was] 
23/ 
authorized by the language adopted. 11 Fully aware, therefore, of 
the fact that the Executive Branch then, as in 1955, understood the pro-
monetary 
V ,- vision as authorizing the imposition / exactions, the Committee 
nevertheless did not recommend any change in its wording to confine 
more narrowly the bounds of its authorization. On the contrary, the 
Committee in its report indicated approvingly its own understanding that 
the statute provided "those best able to judge national security needs 
[with] a way of taking whatever action is needed to avoid a threat to the 
national security through imports. 11 H. R. Rep. No. 1761, 85th Cong., 
2dSess. 13 (1958). 
While Congress made several procedural changes in the statute 
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and established criteria to guide the President• s determination as to 
whether action under the provision might be necessary, it added no 
limitations with respect to the type of action that the President w as 
24/ 
authorized to take. Pub. L. 85-686, § 8, 72 Stat. 673, 678- 6 79. 
The 1958 reenactment, like the 1955 provision, authorized the P r esident 
under appropriate conditions 11to take such action" 11 as he deems necessary 
to adjust imports ... 11 72 Stat. 678- 679. 
When the provision next came up for reexamination, it was re-
enacted without material change as § 232(b) of the Trade Expansion Act 
of 1962. In its analysis, however, the Court of .Appeals placed great 
emphasis on the fact that in the course of Congress• deliberations the 
Senate passed and the conference committee deleted, H. R. Con£. Rep. 
No. 2518, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 ( 1962), an amendment which provided: 
"Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the 
President may, when he finds it in the national 
interest, proclaim w ith respect to any article 
imported into the United State s - ( 1) the increase 
of any existing duty on s uch article to such rates 
as he finds necessary; ( 2) the imposition of a duty 
on such article (if it is not otherwise subject to 
duty) at such rate as he finds necessary, and (3) the 
imposition of such other import restrictions as he 
finds necessary. 11 108 Cong. Rec. 19573 (1962). 
The Court of Appeals inferred from the rejection of this amendment 
that Congress understood the then existing grant of authority to be limited 
to the imposition of quotas. According to the court, the amendment would 
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have ''explicitly [given] the President the same authority he claims 
derives implicitly from § [23 2(b)]" 5 18 F. 2d, at 105 9, and Congress 1 
refusal to enact the amendment was tantamount to a rejection of the 
Government's interpretation of the statute. 
We disagree, however, with the Court of Appeals' assess m ent 
of the proposed amendment. The amendment was in reality far m ore 
than an articulation of the authority that the Government finds to be 
contained in § 232(b). Unlike § 232(b), the rejected proposal would not 
have required a prior investigation and findings by an executive department 
as a prerequisite to Presidential action. Moreover, the broad "nationa l 
interest" language of the proposal, together with its lack of any standards 
for implementing that language, s t ands in stark contrast with § 232(b)' s 
use of the narrower criteron of "national security" and § 232(c) 1 s 
articulation of standards to guide the President in the invocation of his 
powers under § 232(b). In light of these clear differences between the 
rejected proposal and § 232(b), w e d e cline to inf er from the fact 
that the amendment was proposed or from the fact that it was rejected tha t 
Congress felt that the President had no power to impose monetary exactions 
under § 23 2(b). 
Only a few months after President Nixon invoked the provision 
to initiate the import license fee system challenged here, Congress once 
again reenacted the Preside ntial authori z ation encompassed in § 232(b) 
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without material change. Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 
88 Stat. 1978, 1993 ( 1974). Making no mention of the President's action, 
both the Senate Committee report and the conference report, used the 
language of the statute itself to reaffirm that under § 232(b) the President 
"may take such action, and for such time as he deems necessary to adjust 
imports so as to prevent impairment ci. the national security." H. R. Con£. 
Rep. No. 93- 1644, 93rd Cong. 2d Sess. 29 (1974); S. Rep. No. 93-1298, 
93rd Cong. , 2d Ses s. 96- 97 ( 1974). The Congressional acquiescence in 
President Nixon's action manifested by the reenactment of § 232(b) provide s 
yet further corroboration that § 23 2(b) was understood and intended to 
authorize the imposition of monetary exactions as a means of adjusting 
imports. 
Taken as a whole then, the legislative history of § 23 2(b) belies 
any suggestion that Congress, despite its use of broad language in the 
statute itself, intended to limit the President's authority to the imposition 
of quotas and to bar -the President from imposing a license fee system like 
the one challenged here. To the contrary, the provision's original enact-
ment, and its subsequent reenactment in 1958, 1962 and 1974 in the face 
of repeated expressions from Members of Congress and the Executive 
Branch as to their broad understanding of its language, all lead to the 
conclusion that § 232{b) does in fact authorize the actions of the 
President challenged here. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court 
of Appeals to the contrary cannot stand. 
- - 20 - -
A final word is in order. Our holding today is a limited one. As 
respondents themselves acknowledge, a license fee as much as a quota 
has its initial and direct impact on imports, albeit on their price as 
opposed to their quantity. Brief for Respondents, at 26. As a consequence, 
our conclusion here, fully supported by the relevant legislative history, -
that the imposition of a license fee is authorized by § 23 2(b) in no way 
compels the further conclusion that any action the President might take, 
as long as it has even a re1note impact on imports, is also so authorized. 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and thi s case -
is remanded to that court for proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
So ordered. 
- -
FOOTNOTES 
1/ 
Section 232(b) provides in full: 
"Upon request of the head of any depart-
ment or agency, upon application of an interested 
party, or upon his own motion, the Secretary of 
the Treasury (hereinafter referred to as the 
'Secretary') shall immediately make an appropriate 
investigation, in the course of which he shall se e k 
information and advice from, and shall consult 
with, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of 
Commerce, and other appropriate officers of the 
United States, to determine the effects on the 
national security of imports of the article which 
is the subject of such request, application, or 
motion. The Secretary shall, if it is appropriate 
and after reasonable notice, hold public hearings 
or otherwise afford interested parties an 
opportunity to present information and advice 
relevant to such investigation. The Secretary 
shall report the findings of his investigation 
under this subsection with respect to the effect 
of the importation of such article in such quantities 
or under such circumstances upon the national 
security and, based on such findings, his 
recommendation for action or inaction under 
this section to the President within one year 
after receiving an application from an interested 
party or otherwise beginning an investigation 
under this subsection. If the Secretary finds 
that such article is being imported into the United 
States in such quantities or under such circumstances 
as to threaten to impair the national security, he 
shall so advise the President and the President 
shall take such action, and for such time, as he 
deen1s necessary to adjust the imports of such 
article and its derivatives so that such imports 
will not threaten to impair the national security, 
unless the President detern1ines that the article 
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is not being imported into the United States in 
such quantities or under such circumstances 
as to threaten to impair the national security." 
Section 232(c) of the Act, 19 U.S. C. 1862(c) (Supp IV) provides 
the President and the Secretary of the Treasury with guidance as to 
some of the factors to be considered in implementing § 232(b). It 
provides: 
"For the purposes of this section, the 
Secretary and the President shall, in the light 
of the requirements of national security and 
without excluding other relevant factors, give 
consideration to domestic production needed 
for projected national defense requirements, 
the capacity of domestic industries to meet 
such requirements, existing and anticipated 
availabilities of the human resources, 
products, raw materials, and other supplies 
and services essential to the national defense, 
the requirements of growth of such industries 
and such supplies and services including the 
investment, exploration, and development 
necessary to assure such growth, and the 
importation of goods in terms of their 
quantities, availabilities, character, and use 
as those affect such industries and the capacity 
of the United States to meet national security 
requirements. In the administration of this 
section, the Secretary and the President shall 
further recognize the close relation of the 
economic welfare of the Nation to our national 
security, and shall take into consideration 
the impact of foreign competition on the 
economic welfare of individual domestic 
industries; and any substantial unemployment, 
decrease in revenues of government, loss of 
skills or inv estment, or other serious effects 
resulting from the displacement of any domestic 
products by excessive imports shall be considered, 
without excluding other factors, in determining 
2/ 
FN - 3 
whether such weakening of our internal 
economy may impair the national security." 
See Cabinet Task Force on Oil Im.port Control, The Oil 
Import Question 7 ( 1970). 
3/ 
Under President Nixon's plan, motor gasoline was scheduled 
to reach its maximum fee of 63 cents on May 1, 1975. Appendix, at 
97. 
4/ 
The schedule under which exemptions from the fees, 
supra, were not to be eliminated until 1980, pages 3 -4, was not altered. 
5/ 
The supplemental fee increases scheduled to go into effect 
in March and April were twice deferred. See Pres. Proc. 4355, 
40 Fed. Reg. 10437 (1975); Pres. Proc. 4370, 40 Fed. Reg. 19421 
(1975). While the $2. 00 fee finally went into effect on June 1, 1975, 
Pres. Proc. 43 77, 40 Fed. Reg. 23429 ( 1975), it was never increased 
to $3. 00. Indeed, on January 3, 1976, President Ford eliminated 
the $2. 00 fee. Pres. Proc. 4412, 41 Fed. Reg. 1037 (1976). See 
note 8, infra. 
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6/ 
The states joining in the suit together with their governors 
were Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, 
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island and Vermont. The State of Minnesota 
intervened as a plaintiff after the complaint was filed and is also a 
respondent here. 
7/ 
The ten utility companies are Algonquin SNG, Inc., New 
England Power Co., New Bedford Gas and Edison Light Co., 
Cambridge Electric Light Co., Canal Electric Co., Montaup Electric 
Co., Connecticut Light and Pow er Co. , Hartford Electric Light Co., 
Western Massachusetts Electric Light Co., and Holyoke Water Co. 
8/ 
Subsequent to our granting certiorari, the President signed the 
Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975, Pub. L. 94- 163, 89 Stat. 
87 I. The Act is aimed at encouraging dorn.estic oil production by 
gradually decontrolling the price of domestically produced crude oil. 
On January 3, 1976, indicating that 11 the purpose of the supplemental 
[oil import license] fee" will be served by the Act, the President 
announced the elimination of the supplemental fees imposed by 
Presidential Proclamation 4341. Pres. Proc. 4412, 41 Fed. Reg. 
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1037. He did not, however, eliminate the 11 first-tier 11 fees originally 
imposed by Presidential Proclamation 4210. Since respondents seek 
to enjoin the first-tier as well as the supplemental fees, the question 
here of whether § 232(b) grants the President authority to impose 
license fees remains a live controversy. 
9/ 
Respondents 1 suits are not barred by the Anti-Injunction Act , 
26 U.S. C. § 7421(a), which in relevant part provides that 11 n o suit for 
the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax shall 
be maintained in any court by any person ... 11 The Anti-Injunction 
Act applies to suits brought to restrain assessment of taxes asses~-
able under the Internal Revenue Codes of 1954 and 1939. 26 U.S. C. 
§ § 7421(a), 785 l(a)(6)(A), 785 l(a)(6)(C)(iv). The license fees in this 
case are assessed under neither Code but rather under the authority 
conferred on the President by the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as 
amended by the Trade Act of 1974. The fees are therefore not "taxes 11 
within the scope of the Anti-Injunction Act. 
10/ 
Respondents rely on our decision in National Cable Tele-
vision Association Inc. v. United States, 415 U.S. 336 (1974), to 
support their delegation doctrine argument. But we find that case 
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clearly distinguishable from the one before us today. In National 
Cable Television, we held that the fees to be imposed on community 
antenna television systems should be measured by the "value to the 
recipient 11 even though the language of the general statute allowing 
fee-setting by federal agencies, 31 U.S. C. § 483(a), allows consider-
ation not only of 11 value to the recipient 11 but also of "public policy 
or interest served and other pertinent facts. 11 Ibid. The Court 's 
conclusion that the words of the last-quoted phrase were not relevant 
to the CATV situation was apparently motivated by a desire to avoid 
any delegation doctrine problem that might have been presented by 
a contrary conclusion. 415 U.S., at 342. But what might be considered 
the open-ended nature of the phrase 11 public policy or interest served 
and other pertinent facts 11 stands in contrast to § 232(b)' s more limited 
authorization of the President to act only to the extent necessary to 
eliminate a threat of impairment to the national security and § 232(c) 1 s 
articulation of standards to guide the President in making the decision 
whether to act. See n. 1, supra. 
11/ 
The amount of oil exempted from the 11 first-tier" license 
fees, see page 8, supra, imposed in 1973 varies among five geographical 
districts within the Nation. See Pres. Proc. 4341, 40 Fed. Reg. 3965 
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(1975), Pres. Proc. 4210, 38 Fed. Reg. 9645 (1973). Respondents 
seize on this fact to argue that the 11 first-tier 11 fee schedule contra-
venes Article I, § l, cl. 8 of the Constitution which requires iinport 
duties to be uniform throughout the United States. But that issue is 
not properly before the Court. Sustaining respondents' uniformity 
clause argument would call not for invalidation of the entire license 
fee scheme, but only for elimination of the geographical differe nces 
in the exemptions allowed under it. This would represent not an 
affirn~ance of the judgments below which effectively invalidated the 
entire scheme and its implementing regulations, but rather a 
modification of those judgments. But since respondents filed no 
cross-petition for certiorari, they are at this point precluded from 
seeking such modification. See Mill s v. Electric Auto Lite Co. , 
396 U.S. 375, 381 n. 4 (1970). 
12/ 
See, ~, Hearings on H. R. 1 before the House Comm ittee 
on Ways and Means, 84th Cong ., 1st Sess., 1006 (analytical balance 
industry), 1266 (petroleuin industry) ( 1955); Hearings on H. R. 1 before 
the Senate Committee on Finance, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 602 (lead 
and zinc mining industry), 721 (coal mining industry) (1955). 
1.3/ 
The Symington amendment is currently codified in some-
FN - 8 
what modified form at 19 U.S. C. § 1862(a). 
14/ 
In contrast to the Senate Committee on Finance, the 
House Committee on Ways and Means concluded that the Symington 
amendment was adequate to deal with any potential threats to the 
national security posed by foreign imports. H. R. Rep. No. 50, 
84th Cong., 1st Sess. 44 (1955). 
15/ 
A separate portion of the Neely amendment would have 
placed quotas on petroleum imports. 1955 Senate Hearings, at 1032. 
16/ 
Unlike the Neely amendment, see note 15, supra, the 
Byrd-Millikin amendment did not single out any named industries for 
protection by quotas. 
17/ 
Differing with the Court of Appeals, we do not believe that 
the fact that Senator Millikin represented a State that might have bene-
fitted from an expansive reading of the statute 11 blurs [the J probative 
value, 11 518 F. 2d. at 1058, of his explanation. Many if not most 
pieces of legislation are sponsored by Members of Congress whose 
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constituents have a special interest in their passage, but we have 
never let this fact diminish the weight we give a sponsor's statements. 
18/ 
Moreover, Senator Byrd's reference in the above-quoted 
exchange to the power of the President under the amendment 11 to 
impose a quota or to reduce imports 11 , 101 Cong. Rec. 5297, also 
suggests that he understood that power to extend beyond the im.position 
of quotas. See Note, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 432, 435 n. 31 ( 1975). 
19/ 
The Court of Appeals characterized Senator Bennett's 
rem.arks as going to 11 the entire bill and other existing laws. 11 518 
F. 2d, at 1057. However, our examination of the context of his 
remarks persuades us that they were more probably made in specific 
reference to the Byrd-Millikin amendment. 
20/ 
A copy of the Morgan letter was also sent to Senator Byrd, 
Chairman of the Senate Committee on Finance. See 101 Cong. Rec. 
8162 (1955). 
21/ 
As finally enacted the amendment provided: 
-
22/ 
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"In order to further the policy and purposes 
of this section, whenever the Director of the Office 
of Defense Mobilization has reason to believe that 
any article is being imported into the United States 
in such quantities as to threaten to impair the 
national security, he shall so advise the President, 
and if the President agrees that there is reason for 
such belief, the President shall cause an immediate 
investigation to be made to determine the facts. If, 
on the basis of such investigation, and the report 
to him of the findings and recommendations made 
in connection therewith, the President finds that 
the article is being imported into the United State s 
in such quantities as to threaten to impair the 
national security, he shall take such action as h e 
deems necessary to adjust the imports of such 
article to a level that will not threaten to impair 
the national security. 11 
We are not unmindful that, as respondents point out, much 
of the debate in both Houses referred to the Byrd-Millikin amendment 
in the contex t of giving the President the power to impose import quota s . 
See, ~-, 101 Cong. Rec. 5572 ( 1975) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey); 
id., at 5582, 5584 (remarks of Sen. Douglas); id., at 5593 (rem.arks 
of Sen. Monroney); id., at 1668 (remarks of Rep. Flood); id., at 1671 
(remarks of Rep. Perkins). But nowhere do the Congressional debate s 
reflect an understanding that under the amendme nt the President's 
authority was to be limited to the imposition of quotas. In light of this 
fact, we feel fortified in attaching substantial weight to the positive 
indications discussed above that the authority was not so limited. 
. ") - {) 
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23/ 
Foreign Trade Policy, Compendium of Papers on 
United States Foreign Trade Policy Collected by the Staff of the 
Subcommittee on Foreign Trade Policy of the House Committee on 
Ways and Means, 643 ( 1957). 
24/ 
Indeed, while under the I 955 provision the President was 
authorized to act only on a finding that "quantities" of imports 
threatened to impair the national security, the 1958 provision also 
authorized Presidential action on a finding that an article is b e ing 
imported "under such circumstances" as to threaten to ilnpair the 
national security. Trade Agr e eme nts E x tension Act of 1958, Pub. L . 
No. 85 - 686, 72 Stat. 676, 678 -679. See p a ges 10-11, supr~. 
-
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
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.§uvumt QJitnrl of ~ 'Jltttitro .§mft_g 
... M!t-ittghm,J.~. 20ffe~, 
June 10, 1976 
Re: 75-382 - Federal Energy Admin., et al. v. 
Algonquin SNG, et al. 
Dear Thurgood: 
You have written a fine opin~on which I am happy 
to join. 
This thought occurred to me while reading it. We 
regularly accord special deference to an interpretation 
of a statute by the agency charged with responsibility 
for administering it. It seems to me that that rule 
should be applied to a statute giving specific authority 
to the President, particularly when it concerns foreign 
affairs and national security. I wonder if you might 
add a short paragraph acknowledging that the President's 
construction of a statute of this kind is entitled to a 
presumption of validity, or special respect from a 
coordinate branch of government, or something to that 
effect. I make the suggestion because my instincts tell 
me that this opinion has more importance for the future 
than most of our cases this Term. 
In all events, I join without reservation. 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
Copies to the Conference 
Respectfully, 
ft 
CHAMBERS O F 
J U S TI CE POTTER STEWART 
-.:%up-rmtt Q}ltltt"t of tfyt ~nitth j,tattg 
~ asfringhm. ~ . <!}. 2!lffeJl.' 
June 10, 1976 
No. 75-382 - FEA v. Algonquin SNG 
Dear Thurgood, 
I am glad to join your opinion for 
the Court in this case. 
Sincerely yours, 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WM. J . BRENNAN, JR. 
-
,§u:prtmt ~ourt of i~e }1rri:tdl .§tat.ts 
J.1fasfyi-ngt01~ ~- tq. 202nJ 
J une 10, 1976 
RE : No . 75-382 Federal Energy Administration v . Algonquin 
SNG et al. 
Dear Thurgood : 
I agree . 
Mr . Justice Marshal l 
cc: The Conference 
Sincerely, 
I 
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CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE 
June 10, 1976 
Re: No. 75-382 - Federal Energy Administration 
v. Algonquin SNG 
Dear Thurgood: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
Copies to Conference 
June 11, 1976 
No. 75-382 Federal Energy Administration 
v. Algonguin 
Dear Thurgood: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
lfp/as 
cc: The Conference 
- -
~ttprtm:.t ~ttttri qf t£rt ~th ~.hdtg 
~as~~. elf. 2llffe~, 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST J 
June 11, 1976 
Re: No. 75- 382 - Federal Energy Administration v. 
Algonquin 
Dear Thurgood: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely~ 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
- -.:§n:prmu QJOltrl ttf tqt 'Jlfuiltb- ;§taftg 
:.as-fri:ngLtn. ,. QJ. 2llffeJ!.~ 
June 14, 1976 
Re: 75-382 - Federal Energy Administration 
v. A lgonguin SNG 
Dear Thurgood: 
I join your proposed June 9 opinion. 
Regards, 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
Copies to the Conference 
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JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMU N 
u-p--umt QJiruri of t!rt ~1ti±dt •~ 
~a~c'f!pn.gfott. J . <!}. 2!lffeJ.1., 
R e : No . 75-382 - FEA v. Algonquin 
D ea r Thurgood: 
June 14,~ 
Please join me . I would prefer not to add the shor t 
paragraph John has suggested. 
Sincere ly, 
Mr . Justice Mar sha ll 
cc : The C onference 
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